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Audit and Non-Audit Fees:  
Evidence from Sweden 
Abstract   
Purpose - The paper aims to investigate audit and non-audit fees during the global financial 
crisis (GFC) in an environment that is relatively sparsely regulated with regard to the provision 
of non-audit services. 
Design/methodology/approach - Audit and non-audit fees were studied during pre-GFC 
(2006-2007), GFC (2008-2009) and post-GFC (2010-2011) periods. 
Findings - During the GFC Swedish companies benefited from an increase in sales and total 
assets, although return on assets decreased. In this setting, the auditors charged higher audit 
fees compared with the pre-GFC period, despite the absence of increased audit reporting lags. 
A significant increase in audit fees continued during the post-crisis periods with auditors paying 
more attention to companies’ leverage and whether they report losses. At the same time the 
companies spent less on non-audit services. 
Research limitations/implications This study is limited to companies from Sweden which was 
less affected by the GFC.  
Practical implications GFC auditors are able to charge higher audit fees from public 
companies including those that are well performing during financial crises, and they are also 
able to increase the audit fees in the post-crisis period. This implies that auditors put in extra 
audit effort to compensate for higher risk or that they are good at negotiating prices with their 
clients. However, non-audit fees decreased during the same period implying that the demand 
for these services drops under financial instability. 
Originality/value – The study highlights auditors’ behavior in the liberal economic 
environment and it studies both audit fees and non-audit fees before GFC, during GFC and after 
the GFC. The GFC appears to provide audit firms the opportunity to extract higher audit fees. 
Our findings are of interest to managers, auditors and regulators. 
Keywords: Audit fees, non-audit fees, global financial crisis 






The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on audit and 
non-audit fees in a relatively liberal regulatory environment. More specifically, we investigated 
whether changing economic conditions during the recent global financial crisis (GFC) affected 
the level of fees paid for audit and non-audit services paid to the incumbent auditor and whether 
this pattern persisted during a recovery period. The recent GFC has drawn more attention to 
auditing and fees charged by the auditors from their clients (Sikka, 2009). However, the 
evidence on the impact of the GFC on audit fees is contradictory (Krishnan and Zhang, 2013; 
Xu et.al., 2013; Zhang and Huang, 2013) and the impact on non-audit fees is largely unknown. 
A simultaneous study of both audit and non-audit fees over a relative long time period including 
both pre- and post GFC provides a relatively comprehensive view on the company-auditor 
relationship during financial turmoil.  Study findings will ultimately indicate how auditors and 
clients behave under fluctuating macroeconomic conditions.  
Auditing and consultancy services are similar in the sense that the quality of services is typically 
difficult to verify at the time of purchase, implying that the supplier’s reputation or the client’s 
experience with the supplier is a crucial determinant of the purchase decision and the price that 
a buyer is prepared to pay (e.g., Shapiro, 1983; Dasgupta, 2000). However, services are also 
different as the audit is mandatory while consultancy services are purchased only if needed. 
Changing economic conditions may affect clients’ need for audit and consultancy services, the 
level of perceived audit risks and the degree of market competition (Abdel-khalik, 1990; Hill 
et.al., 1994; Srinidhu and Gul, 2007). These circumstances could potentially influence the 
spectrum of required services and affect their price. However, the potential impact of the GFC 
on audit and non-audit services has received little attention in the literature.  
There are only a few studies that have investigated the impact of the GFC on audit fees and 
they provided mixed results. Results from Australia (Xu et al., 2013) and China (Zhang and 
Huang, 2013) show an increase in audit fees during the GFC while data from the US (Krishnan 
and Zhang, 2013) report a decrease in audit fees. The academic literature does not provide any 
evidence concerning the impact of an economic decline on non-audit fees. In order to adapt to 
the changing situation, companies may take actions and restructure their operations which may 
generate an increased need for non-audit services (Firth, 2002). On the other hand, difficult 
3 
 
economic conditions may force companies to prioritize cost-savings and refrain from 
purchasing non-audit services (Srinidhu and Gul, 2007). At this point, it is largely unknown 
whether companies pay more or less in fees for non-audit services during the GFC and in the 
post-GFC period compared with the pre-GFC period which suggests a need for further research.  
Our study contributes to the existing knowledge in three ways. Firstly, we examine the effect 
of changing economic conditions on both audit and non-audit services provided by the 
incumbent auditor. Secondly, contrary to previous studies, we study fees during a longer time 
period. Previous studies investigated the relationship between the GFC and audit fees during 
shorter periods, either during the GFC period (Krishnan and Zhang, 2013; Zhang and Huang, 
2013) or during the periods before and during the crisis (Xu et.al., 2013). Our study covers pre-
GFC (2006-2007), GFC (2008-2009) and post-GFC (2010-2011) periods [1]. Importantly, we 
should notice that the impact of the GFC was relatively mild in Sweden compared with many 
other countries. We believe that an investigation of macroeconomic fluctuations can provide 
more insight into companies’ behavior. More specifically, changes in demand for audit and 
non-audit services can be highlighted. Thirdly, we perform our investigation in a regulatory 
environment that does not prohibit the provision most non-audit services. In such environment, 
the consumption of services from the incumbent auditor is guided to a greater extend by 
companies needs and financial abilities rather than by regulatory constraints. 
Recent findings suggest a link between regulatory environment and audit and non-audit fees. 
For example introducing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the US resulted in the 
largest increase in audit fees and decrease in non-audit fees due to the prohibiting of some non-
audit services (Chan et.al., 2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012). As the result of the ban, the 
auditors incurred additional audit effort due to additional obligatory audit procedures and higher 
litigation risks (Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012). This is indicative 
that regulatory environment exhibits strong effects on audit and non-audit fees.  
When the GFC unfolded in 2008, auditors faced increasing scrutiny in strictly regulated audit 
environments (Xu et. al., 2013). It was, therefore, reasonable to expect changes in fees charged 
by auditors. Several reports have, indeed, addressed the impact of the GFC on audit fees in 
strictly regulated environments: US (Krishnan and Zhang, 2013), Australia (Xu et. al., 2013) 
and China (Zhang and Huang, 2013). The studies from Australia and China indicated an 
increased level of audit fees while the opposite trend was seen in the US study. Importantly 
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these and other studies do not consider the expenditure on other services provided by incumbent 
auditors during GFC. In order to gain a more comprehensive insight into the relationship 
between fees charged by auditors, a more structured approach is needed and we select Sweden 
as our research setting since there are relatively few absolute restrictions on the provision of 
non-audit services. In this approach fees paid for both audit and non-audit services by the same 
companies should be prospectively followed over prolonged periods of time including 
favorable (pre-GFC), GFC and recovery (post-GFC) periods. To the best of our knowledge such 
study has not been performed. We therefore, conducted a study where expenditures for audit 
and non-audit services incurred by 119 Swedish companies were followed during 2006-2011.  
Based on 714 firm-year observations from firms listed on NASDAQ OMX in Stockholm, we 
find a significant increase in audit fees from pre-GFC to GFC and from GFC to post-GFC which 
is consistent with the evidence from Australia and China (Zhang and Huang, 2013; Xu et.al., 
2013). The higher fees were accompanied by a structural change in the audit fee model and we 
notice increased attention to leverage and loss in the GFC and post-GFC period. On the other 
hand, non-audit fees decrease from the pre-GFC period to GFC and post-GFC which can imply 
that companies are less willing to prioritize investments in consulting services during the GFC 
and that they continue to cut consulting expenditures also during the years following the crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. Next, we present the institutional 
setting which is followed by a literature review and development of hypotheses. Thereafter, 
data and research design are described and results are presented. We close with a conclusion 
and discussion section.  
Institutional setting 
National auditing standards based on International Standards on Auditing (ISA) were 
introduced in 2004 in Sweden. There were initially a few adjustments to the standards to make 
them compatible with Swedish laws and regulations. Sweden fully adopted ISA in 2011. The 
disclosure of audit fees and non-audit fees informs outside interested parties about the 
“economic bond” between auditor and client. Listed companies in Sweden are required to 
publish audit fees and non-audit fees paid to the signing auditor as well as fees paid to other 
auditors/audit firms.   
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The audit market in Sweden is dominated by the Big 4 audit firms. They reported revenues of 
1.311 billion Euros in 2011 (1 Euro = 8.3082 SEK) and employed around 50 % of all certified 
auditors (Affärsvärlden 2012; SBPA 2012). The market domination by large audit firms is 
further demonstrated by the fact that the Big 4 audit firms earned 81.2 % of all revenues reported 
by the twelve largest audit firms in 2011. PwC is by far the largest audit firm in terms of 
turnover and the number of employees, followed by Ernst & Young and KPMG and Deloitte 
as number four. The market concentration is even greater for the public listed segment. Only 
ten out of 268 listed companies in 2011 were audited by non-Big 4 auditors [2].  
Regulators are concerned that the provision of consultancy services to audit clients will threaten 
auditor independence, given that it further increases the economic bonding between auditor and 
client. Generally, Swedish laws and practice with regard to independence are consistent with 
the eighth directive of the EU (2006/46/EC), the EU recommendation on auditor independence 
(2002/590/EC) and the IFAC’s Code of Ethics for professional accountants (2006). The 
Swedish Accounting Act (Section 21) requires that an auditor, for each audit assignment, evaluates 
if there exists any circumstances that may impair auditor independence. Provision of advisory 
services is among circumstances that may cause the auditor to withdraw from the audit assignment 
(21-1.b). However, considering the use of various mitigating actions, auditors are not, in general, 
prohibited to provide different types of non-audit services to audit clients. Overall, Sweden uses a 
principle-based approach to auditor independence such as Hong Kong and UK and the 
regulation on provision of non-audit services seem to be less restrictive than the rules applied 
in some other countries, such as the U.S., Australia, China, Japan and Mexico, but also 
compared to Germany and France, where audit firms are not allowed to provide certain types 
of non-audit services to their audit clients (Tafara, 2006).  
There are few court cases against auditors in Sweden implying that the risk of litigation is low. 
However, HQ Bank and Prosolvia are two recent examples of audit failures in Sweden causing 
significant media attention, large settlements and possibly litigation processes in Sweden. The 
Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA) is responsible for issuing disciplinary 
sanctions against certified auditors performing below the standards. During the period of 2006-
2011, a total of 330 disciplinary sanctions were issued against certified auditors which indicate 
that around 8% of all auditors received disciplinary sanctions. The SBPA withdraw the license 
for 42 certified auditors (1%) during this period. Out of the 330 sanctions, 92 cases were to 
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some extent related to auditor independence and 28 were related to provision of non-audit 
services (according to the classification of cases made by the SBPA). To conclude, auditors 
face a moderate risk of being identified with substandard audit performance in the Swedish 
audit market.  
Literature review and development of hypotheses 
The recent GFC raised questions about the role and quality of external auditing in a number of 
countries. At the same time, the levels of audit fees were questioned (Sikka, 2009). Auditors 
were accused of both doing too little (clean audit reports were issued for many of the failing 
companies) and for charging too high audit and non-audit fees. Changing economic conditions 
are challenging for audit firms as well as for their clients since they can affect companies’ risk, 
liquidity as well as degree of market competition. These circumstances can, in turn, influence 
the price for audit and non-audit services. Research under the past three decades have revealed 
the main drivers of audit fees (e.g. Simunic, 1984; Chan et.al., 1993; Anderson and Zéghal, 
1994; Whisenant et.al., 2003; Al-Harshani, 2008). Studies from different countries provided 
evidence that audit fees are largely determined by the company’s size, complexity, risks factors 
as well as the size of auditor (e.g. Simunic, 1984; Gerrard et.al., 1994; DeFond et.al., 2000). In 
case of simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services, the levels of both services are 
showed to be positively affected in the vast majority of studies (e.g. Davis et.al., 1993; Barkess 
and Simnett, 1994; Ezzamel et.al., 1996; Antle et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2012). Despite 
extensive research, very little is known about the impact of macroeconomic factors, like 
financial crisis, on audit and non-audit fees. The academic studies have reported different 
impact of the GFC on audit fees and the impact of financial crisis on the level of non-audit fees 
is largely unknown.  
Impact of financial crisis on audit fees 
In general, periods of economic decline increase companies’ risk level. More specifically, there 
is a higher risk that companies may violate conditions specified in debt contracts, such as the 
proportion of equity to debt, or that they may go bankrupt. The higher risk level and growing 
concern from creditors and investors will force auditors to apply more extensive audit 
procedures and to invest more audit effort in the evaluation of going concern assumptions (Choi 
et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008; Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009; Zhang and Huang, 2013). 
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The growing need for assurance during economic downturns, as well as an increased litigation 
risk for auditors, is likely to increase the auditor effort (i.e. audit hours). Furthermore, an 
economic downturn can cause “specific corporate events” described by Firth (2002). He 
showed that when specific events, like mergers, acquisitions and business restructuring, do take 
place, the need for auditing increases. This occurs because specific events often involve 
adjustments of the client’s accounting and information systems. Auditors need to put in more 
effort to learn how events change the accounting system (Firth, 2002). Additional audit efforts 
for consolidation exercises can also be required during a few years after the event (Firth, 2002, 
p.682).  
Another way to respond to the increased client’s risk might be to employ a risk premium on 
audit fees. As compensation for possible losses in terms of sanctions, litigations, impaired 
reputation and financial costs, auditors may use risk-adjusted billings rates (Brumfield et.al., 
1983). Niemi (2002) found evidence on the existence of a risk premium for listed companies in 
Finland with a risk higher than average. However, the result did not reveal any risk premium 
for distressed companies. On the contrary, the finding indicted that those clients who reported 
losses paid lower fees than those clients who performed better. 
On the other hand, economic fluctuations often cause changes in market conditions. Abdel-
khalik (1990, p.300) analyzed the relationship between competition on the audit market and 
economic conditions in different regions in the US and he argued that the economic downturn 
reduces the demand for audit service and enhances competition among audit firms. In order to 
deal with the temporary overcapacity of experienced labor, the audit firms would likely reduce 
their price for services. Also, in such a situation, companies would have strong incentives and 
a favorable position to actively negotiate for a reduced audit price. Maher et al. (1992) 
documented a significant decrease in real audit fees in the US from 1977 to 1981 and attributed 
this to increased competition in the market for audit services following the economic downturn 
of the late 70s and early 80s. Many audit clients in the US were also able to negotiate lower 
audit fees in 2008 and 2009 (Krishnan and Zhang, 2013). Figures over revenues, numbers of 
employees, CPAs, partners etc. reported by the audit firms in Sweden provides however no 
indication of increased competition at the Swedish audits market (see Affärsvärlden 2012). 
The existing literature provides mixed evidence regarding the impact of the GFC on the level 
of audit fees. Xu et al. (2013) studied audit fees in Australia and reported an increase in audit 
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fees during the period 2008-2009 compared with the GFC period. The authors attributed the 
higher fees to an increase in client business risk which caused additional audit effort. Higher 
audit fees during the GFC were also reported from China (Zhang and Huang, 2013). The result 
suggests the increased risk premium caused by increased firm risk. Nevertheless, research from 
US by Krishnan and Zhang (2013) revealed that financial companies were able to negotiate 
lower price for audit service during the GFC. Thus, the empirical findings on the effect of the 
recent financial crisis on audit fees are mixed.  
Although there are mixed evidence in the literature, we expect auditors to react to the increased 
risk that follows from an economic downturn by increasing the risk premium and by putting in 
additional effort. We should also consider that companies do not know there inherent demand 
for audit services due to the nature of audit service. We therefore formulate the following 
directional hypotheses:  
H1: Audit fees increase from pre-GFC period to GFC and post-GFC periods.  
Effect of a financial crisis on non-audit fees 
In general, the demand for non-audit services is driven by the need for external support, the 
willingness or ability to pay for services and the perceived quality of the services delivered by 
the audit firm (Svanström and Sundgren, 2012).   
An economic downturn is generally characterized by a sharp decline in the demand for products 
and services. This can, in turn, lead to reduced liquidity for many companies (Cornett et.al., 
2011). The shortage of capital may force companies to decrease their consumption or totally 
refrain from using external consultants. During crisis, companies tend to focus on their core 
activities and investments in external services including using the auditor for consulting may 
not be prioritized. Srinidhu and Gul (2007) documented that non-audit fees for US companies 
dropped significantly from 2000 to 2001 and argued that audit clients were scaling down on 
consulting services from the auditor during economic downturns. Although auditors may be 
proactive in selling different types of non-audit services to audit clients, the opportunities are 
relatively limited given that the client is under pressure to minimize expenditures and knows 
his or her inherent demand.   
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However, in order to adapt to changing economic conditions such as a financial crisis, 
companies may be forced to take actions and restructure their operations. The restructuring, 
acquisitions and other changes take place rarely and companies’ own experience may, therefore, 
be insufficient and additional consultancy is required during the process. Firth (2002) argues 
that when such specific events take place, the purchasing of non-audit service increases. Firth 
(1997) argues that poorly performing companies have additional incentives to hire consultants 
since it indicates that the company is ineffective. This awareness and pressures from the market 
are expected to make companies more willing to purchase consulting services in order to 
improve their profitability. According to Hay et al. (2006), there is also some support for the 
proposition that companies with problems require a greater amount of non-audit services than 
other firms. 
While the underlying need for advisory services and external support is likely to increase under 
an economic downturn, we expect companies to prioritize cost saving and scale down on 
support services. Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H2: Non-audit fees decrease from pre-GFC period to GFC and post-GFCs periods. 
Data and research design 
Sample 
Our sample consists of companies listed on small- and mid-cap at NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
in 2012. A total number of 195 companies were identified. Financial institutions and utilities 
were excluded since their asset structure was different to other industries. The sample without 
financial companies and utilities comprised 166 companies. Since we aimed at capturing the 
impact of economic fluctuations on audit and non-audit fees, it was essential to include 
companies having the same accounting period. In order to avoid a potential statistical bias, we 
follow the same companies over a six-year period. The number of companies for each year was 
119 yielding a total number of 238 observations for every two-year period. The final sample 
consisted of 119 companies for each year from 2006 to 2011, yielding 714 firm-year 
observations. The companies’ data for 2006-2011 were obtained directly from annual reports. 
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The study focuses on the period 2006-2011, since this time span covers different economic 
conditions. The GFC hit Sweden in 2008. The deepest decline in the Swedish economy occurred 
during 2008-2009. After this period, a gradual economic recovery could be clearly observed 
according to Sweden’s GDP growth rate (see also note 1). In order to find possible effects of 
these fluctuations on audit and non-audit fees, we arbitrarily examine three periods of equal 
length, conditionally designating them as pre-GFC (2006-2007), GFC (2008-2009) and post-
GFC periods (2010-2011). We calculated the ratios Audit fees/Total fees and Non-audit 
fees/Total fees for each two-year period. In order to control auditor characteristics, we identified 
the name of the signing auditor/s from the companies’ annual reports. We then used a file 
received from the SBPA to include information on experience as a certified auditor.  
Research design 
We tested our hypotheses in two ways. First, we examined the following two regression models, 
with LNAUDIT and LNNAF as dependent variables: 
i) LNAUDIT = βo + β1 LNNAF + β2*LNTA+ β3*SQSEGS + β4*LNSUBS + 
β5*LNFSUBS+ β6* INVREC + β7*ROA + β8*LEV+ β9*LOSS + β10*SALES + 
β11*TWOAUDITORS + β12*BIG4 + β13*GENDER + β14*EXPERIENCE + 
β15*TENURE+ β16* AUDLAG+ β17*CRISIS + β18*POSTCRISIS + e 
 
ii) LNNAF = βo + β1*LNAUDIT + β2*LNTA+ β3*SQSEGS + β4*LNSUBS + 
β5*LNFSUBS+ β6*INVREC + β7*ROA + β8*LEV+ β9*LOSS + β10*SALES + 
β11*BIG4 + β12*TENURE + β13* CRISIS + β14* POSTCRISIS + e 
Where,  
LNAUDIT =   Natural logarithm of the company’s audit fees 
LNNAF =   Natural logarithm of the company’s non-audit fees   
TAX =   Indicator variable taking the value 1, where the company purchases 
tax services and zero otherwise 
OTHERNAF =  Indicator variable taking the value 1, where the company purchases 




LNTA =   Natural logarithm of total assets 
SQSEGS =   Square root of the number of segments 
SQEMPLS =  Square root of the number of employees 
LNSUBS =  Natural logarithm of the number of Swedish subsidiaries 
LNFSUBS =   Natural logarithm of the number of foreign subsidiaries 
INVREC =   Inventory plus accounts receivable, divided by total assets 
ROA =   Return on assets, calculated as operating income divided by total 
assets 
LEV =   Total debt divided by total assets 
LOSS =   Indicator variable that is coded 1 if the net profit is negative in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. 
LNSALES =   Natural logarithm of turnover 
BIG 4 =   Indicator variable that is coded 1 if auditor is PwC, E&Y, KPMG or 
Deloitte, and zero otherwise. 
TENURE =   Natural logarithm of auditor-client relationship in years  
AUDLAG =   Number of days between the end of accounting period and the 
signing of audit report 
TWOAUDITORS =  Indicator variable that is coded 1 if audit report is signed by two 
auditors from the same audit firm, and zero otherwise 
EXPERIENCE =  Number of years as a certified auditor.   
GENDER =   Indictor variable that is coded 1 if the auditor is a female, and zero 
otherwise.  
GFC =   Indicator variable taking the value 1 during 2008-2009, and zero 
otherwise.  
POST-GFC =  Indicator variable taking the value 1 during 2010-2011, and zero 
otherwise.  
To capture any possible effect of changed economic conditions we included two indicator 
variables, GFC and POST-GFC, taking the value one for the period 2008 to 2009 and for the 
period 2010 to 2011 respectively. The pre-GFC period is in the reference category. 
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Second, we estimated the ratios Audit fees/Total fees and Non-audit fees/Total fees. The ratios 
were than compared for the three periods using a t-test.  
In this study we use the following categories of control variables: (1) company’s size, (2) 
complexity, (3) risks, (4) auditor’s size, (5) auditor tenure, (6) audit reporting lag, (7) two 
auditors signing the audit report, (8) auditor-in-charge (AIC) characteristics. Variables of 
groups 1-5 are included in both models. Variables of groups 6-8 concern only the audit fee 
model.  
The company’s size has proved to be the most important driver of audit fees (see Hay et.al., 
2006). To check for size, we follow Barkess and Simnett (1994) who used the natural logarithm 
of the company’s total assets (LNTA) and sales (SALES). Audit complexity is another essential 
determinant of fees. Due to nonlinearity of the relationship between complexity and fees 
(Palmrose, 1986), we use LNSUBS, LNFSUBS to ensure a better fit of these measures in the 
regression model. In accordance with Whisenant et al. (2003), we include a variable for number 
of segments, SQSEGS.  In order to check for different aspects of risks, we include INVREC, 
ROA, LOSS and LEV in the model (Niemi, 2002; Whisenant et al., 2003). A stream of studies 
has found evidence for the existence of premiums paid to the large audit firms (now defined as 
“Big Four”) (e.g. Francis, 1984; Crasswell et.al., 1995; Ferguson, 2003; Caneghem, 2010). To 
check for this, we include BIG 4 in our model.  
Prior studies (e.g. Gul et.al., 2007; Krishnan and Yu, 2011) suggested that the length of the 
relationship between the audit and the client has an impact on fees. To check for this, we include 
TENURE in the model. Stanley (2011) found that the length between the end of the accounting 
period and the signing of the audit report is positively related to audit fees. Therefore, we 
include AUDLAG in the audit fees model. Swedish legislation allows for the appointment of 
two responsible auditors and, in our sample, around 10 percent of companies had audit reports 
signed by two auditors. In accordance with Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008), we expect a 
possible effect of such circumstance on audit fees and therefore include an indicator variable, 
TWOAUDITORS. 
The effect of AIC characteristics on audit quality has recently received substantial attention in 
the audit literature (Goodwin, 2012; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Gul et.al., 2013; Ittonen et.al., 
2013; Sundgren and Svanström, 2014). Ittonen and Peni (2012) found that female auditors in 
13 
 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland charged a higher price for audit services than male auditors. We 
also expect that auditors with longer experience of the audit profession could charge a higher 
price than less experienced auditors. In this study, we include GENDER and EXPERIENCE in 
audit fees model to control for potential AIC effects.  
Summary statistics  
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample, including 714 observations from 
2006-2011 and for the three investigated periods: the pre-GFC (2006-2007), the GFC (2008-
2009) and the post-GFC (2010-2011) periods. All 119 companies were followed during the 
whole study period. Our data indicate that 94 percent of all companies are audited by the Big 
Four firms. The sample is dominated by male auditors with female auditors representing only 
12.5 percent of the sample. The average experience of the AIC is 19.4 years.  
[Insert Table I about here] 
The Table I shows that the lowest value of audit fees was during the pre-GFC period and the 
highest audit fees were during the post-GFC period. Average audit fees (AUFEE) increase about 
9 percent between pre-GFC and GFC and about 19 percent between pre-GFC and post-GFC 
periods. The increase is significant between pre-GFC and GFC and pre-GFC and post-GFC 
periods. Non-audit fees (NASFEE) show a tendency for the opposite trend. Average non-audit 
service fees decline 7 and 13 percent over the respective periods. The difference between pre-
GFC and post-GFC is close to significant.  
Turning to control variables, the mean of return on assets (ROA) was highest, 0.075 during the 
pre-GFC economic conditions and then declined to 0.017 and 0.013 during the two other 
periods. The mean leverage was highest during the GFC (0.566). Interestingly, the t-test 
indicates a significant increase in companies’ assets (LNTA) and SALES between pre-GFC and 
post-GFC periods.  
The number of companies which reported negative profits during the previous year was highest 
(29%) after the GFC and the lowest (24%) during the pre-GFC period. Before the GFC, 92.4 
percent of the companies were audited by the Big Four auditors. During the GFC, the Big Four 
share increased to 94 percent and then to 95 percent in the post-GFC period.  
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However, the tests of differences between the periods have not showed any significant changes 
in AUDLAG indicating that the time spent for audit report remained the same over changed 
macroeconomic conditions. 
Results  
Main analyses  
Table II reports the correlations between the dependent and independent variables included in 
the regression models. Correlations below 0.8 should not cause biased regression estimates due 
to multicollinearity (Judge et.al., 1988). The highest correlation of 0.701 is between LNTA and 
SALES.  
[Insert Table II about here] 
We hypothesize that macroeconomic fluctuations affect the level of fees for audit and non-audit 
services due to increased level of risk as well as changing needs and priorities of companies. 
To prove our conjecture, we run our regression models for audit and non-audit fees for the 
entire study period, 2006-2011, where we include two indicator variables, GFC (i.e. 2008-2009) 
and POST-GFC  (i.e. 2010-2011), with the pre-GFC period (i.e. 2006-2007) being in the 
reference category.  
Table III shows the results of equations (i) and (ii). The fit of the audit fee model is relatively 
high (adjusted R2=0.784) and the explanatory power of the model is in line with studies 
conducted in other counties (e.g. Ezzamel et.al., 1996; Firth, 1997; Firh, 2002; Thinggaard and 
Kiertzner, 2008). Variables of interest are GFC and POST-GFC. GFC has a positive sign and 
is significant at the 0.01 level. The variable POST-GFC is also positively related to audit fees 
and is highly significant (p ˂0.001). Thus, the result indicates an increase in audit fees during 
the GFC and post-GFC periods. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
The fit of the non-audit fee model is about 26 percent (Adjusted R2 =0.262). In this model both 
variables, GFC and POST-GFC, have instead a negative sign. The variable GFC is significant 
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at the 0.1 level. The variable POST-GFC is highly significant (p ˂0.001). The result confirms 
that companies cut down on consulting services when entering an economic downturn and also 
indicates that the non-audit fee level remains low during the period immediately thereafter.  
In the model for audit fees (Table III, Panel A), LNNAF is positive and highly significant (p 
˂0.001). The result is consistent with previous research, which found a significant positive 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees (e.g. Davis et.al.; 1993; Ezzamel et.al., 2002; 
Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008; Chan et.al., 2012). The finding indicates that increased 
consumption of non-audit service is associated with an increase in audit fees. In line with prior 
research, the variables checking for company size (LNTA, LNSALES) have positive signs and 
are statistically significant. Next, variables of complexity (LNSUBS, LNFSUBS, SQSEGS) also 
have a positive sign and are significant. INVREC is significant and positively related to audit 
fees. ROA has a negative sign and is significant, which is in line with most audit fee research 
(Hay et.al., 2006).  
Results reported, however, show an insignificant association between LOSS and audit fees. This 
finding is consistent with Krishnan and Yu (2011) who failed to find any strong relationship 
between these two variables. Big 4 has a positive sign and is significant indicating that the BIG 
4 auditors charge a fee premium. This finding is in line with prior research (Francis, 1984; 
Ferguson, 2003; Caneghem, 2010). The result does not provide any support for the effect of 
TENURE on audit fees. The individual auditor variables, GENDER and EXPERIENCE, are also 
not significantly associated with audit fees.  
Table III, Panel B provides evidence that non-audit fees are strongly and positively associated 
with audit fees, which is consistent with previous research (e.g. Barkess and Simnett, 1994; 
Whisenant et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2012). Other essential drivers for non-audit fees are LNTA 
and LNSUBS. These findings are in line with the above studies which confirm the importance 
of the client size and complexity in determining non-audit fees. In contrast to Whisenant et al. 
(2003) and Chan et.al. (2012), our result revealed a significantly positive relationship between 
LOSS and non-audit fees.  
Big 4 has a positive sign but the variable is not significant. This result contrasts with Whisenant 
et al. (2003) who found a significant effect of the Big 4 auditors on non-audit fees. TENURE 
has a positive sign and is close to significant suggesting that the longer the relationship between 
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the AIC and the client, the higher is the demand for non-audit services. This finding is consistent 
with Krishnan and Yu (2011). 
Table IV reports the results of a t-test on differences between the study periods for the ratios 
audit fees to total fees and non-audit fees to total fees. The ratio audit fees to total fees 
demonstrates that the proportion of audit fees increases over the three study periods. The 
increase of the ratio is significant at 0.1 level between the pre-GFC and GFC periods and at a 
0.05 level between the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods.  
The ratio non-audit fees to total fees shows that that proportion of non-audit fees decreases 
significantly over the study periods. The change is also significant at a 0.1 level between the 
pre-GFC and GFC periods and at 0.05 level between the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods. 
Therefore, the results support the regression results that the GFC significantly changes the level 
of expenditures on audit and non-audit services. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
In summary, the results show an increase in audit fees during, as well as after, the crisis and a 
decrease in non-audit fees over the same periods. 
Additional analyses 
To provide additional insights related to our hypotheses we performed a number of 
supplementary tests.  
Control for connection with the US 
We have controlled for the companies’ relationship with the US assuming that the firms 
collaborating with this country might suffer from the financial distress to a higher extend, and, 
therefore, affecting the level of audit fees. To control for this possible effect we included a 
dummy variable US in the model for audit fees. First, we identified all companies having some 
activity in the US and examined a possible affect on audit fees. The result did not show any 
significant effect of such activity. Second, we identified the companies which have minimum 
25 percent of their business in the US. Neither was there any relationship. Therefore, the results 
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(untabulated) show that the fact of operating in the US does not have any impact on audit fees 
suggesting that an increase in fee levels was caused by Swedish local conditions. 
Determinants of audit and non-audit fees during pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods 
In our main analysis we investigated the impact of the GFC on the level of audit and non-audit 
fees. To examine whether changes in fee levels were accompanied by any possible structural 
changes in the models for audit and non-audit fees, we estimated two regression models for 
each investigated period: 2006-2007, 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 (Table III). The same 119 
companies were examined during three periods with different economic conditions. The fit of 
audit fee model is relatively high (adjusted R2 is 0.781, 0.800 and 0.762 respectively). However, 
the result reveals some shift in the impact on fees by some variables. All risk variables show 
the expected signs. Nevertheless, INVREC is significantly related to audit fees only during the 
pre-GFC period. On the contrary, LEV significantly affects audit fees during the GFC and the 
period following immediately thereafter. The result suggests that auditors have put more 
attention on firms leverage during the declining macroeconomic situation. The finding also 
indicates an increased importance of LOSS during the post-GFC period.  
The explanatory power of non-audit fee model is lower GFC to the post-GFC period (adjusted 
R2 is 0.415, 0.197 and 0.169). Variable LOSS is positive and highly significant (p < 0.001) 
during the pre-GFC period but not significant during two other periods. The positive significant 
result supports the statement that poorly performing firms have a greater need in consultancy 
services (Firth, 2002; Hay et.al., 2006). The statement, however, is supported only for the pre-
GFC period. Generally the result has not showed any major changes concerning the impact of 
variables on non-audit fees.  
Robustness check 
The results of the regressions models indicate that the GFC can have an impact on audit and 
non-audit fees. To check the robustness of the results we conducted several additional tests. In 
accordance with Krishnan and Yu (2011), we delete 1% of outliers at each tail for dependent 
variables as well as continuous independent variables in the regression models. The results (not 




To check whether the results are affected by company, we divided our total sample into two 
samples of large and small companies according to total assets and examined our regression 
models for these two groups. The results for both samples (not tabulated) are qualitatively 
similar to the result for the whole sample. Both groups show an increase in audit fees during 
the GFC and post-GFC periods. The results for small companies are significant at 0.002 and < 
0.001 for the pre-GFC and the post-GFC periods respectively. The finding for large companies 
is significant at 0.1 and 0.005 for the pre-GFC and the post-GFC periods respectively. The 
results concerning non-audit fees in the two subsamples are largely in line with result for the 
main sample. Both groups demonstrate a decrease in non-audit fees during the GFC and the 
period following immediately thereafter. However, the coefficient for GFC is insignificant in 
both samples. When it comes to the post-GFC period, the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 
level for both subsamples. In general, the results for small and large companies confirm our 
main results.  
Assuming an intricate relationship between crisis and companies risks, we examine the 
interaction between our indicator variables for the GFC and post-GFC periods and different 
risk measures. According to White and Lu (2010), the critical core variables are precisely 
those whose effects are of primary interest. We therefore selected four different risk variables 
(INVREC, ROA, LOSS, LEV) and subsequently included them, one by one, in our two models. 
We hypothesized that calculating four variables simultaneously can have a cumulative effect 
on audit fees. Therefore, choosing and testing one core risk variable at a time can eliminate a 
risk of a possible cumulative effect of a sum of four variables. This approach can further 
contribute to the robustness of our analysis.  
The results of these tests indicate that despite the level of companies’ risk, audit fees tended to 
increase while non-audit fees tended to move in an opposite direction over the GFC and post-
GFC periods. The variables GFC and POST-GFC are significant in all three models. The 
additional analyses overall confirm the reported main results.   
Conclusion and discussion 
This study addresses the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on the fees paid for audit 
and non-audit services. More specifically, we focus on how the recent global financial crisis 
affected the fees paid to the incumbent auditor during pre-GFC; GFC and post-GFC periods. 
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Macroeconomic conditions can affect client risks, demand and ability to pay for different types 
of services as well as the auditor’s response to the increased client’s risk and the degree of 
market competition. These circumstances could ultimately impact the amount of services 
purchased and their price. The findings indicate how companies and auditors behave in a 
fluctuating economic environment which is of interest to regulators and outside investors.   
Using 714 firm-year observations listed on Stockholm OMX in 2012, we show that the level of 
audit and non-audit fees varies between pre-GFC; GFC and post-GFC periods. Our data show 
that increased audit fees during GFC are associated with a structural change in the audit fee 
model and the auditors appear to charge higher premium even from well performing companies. 
No direct evidence was found to suggest increasing auditors’ efforts. Auditors are able to charge 
higher audit fees without taking longer time to finalize the audit report which suggest that audit 
firms may increase their risk premium on audit assignments under GFC. However, we cannot 
rule out that audit firms put in more effort within the same amount of time.   
 A significantly higher level of audit fees was also documented during the post-GFC period 
compared with the pre-GFC period implying that auditors are reluctant to reduce audit fees as 
a response to lower risk levels. Next, our results show that non-audit fees decreases in the GFC 
and the post-GFC periods, implying that financial constraints or financial uncertainty make 
companies less willing to prioritize investments in consulting services. In general companies 
seem to behave more careful under the GFC and they also take their time before increasing their 
expenditures on consulting support again. It suggests that that firms are price sensitive with 
regarding to consulting services and also that auditors are unable to promote an increase in 
client firms spending on non-audit services. The reader should note that the generalizability of 
study findings are limited to institutional settings characterized with relatively few absolute 
restrictions regarding provision of non-audit services to audit clients as well as to jurisdictions 





1. According to the US National Bureau of Economic Research, the GFC in the US began 
in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. The change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) suggests that the GFC in Sweden lasted during 2008 and 2009 (Statistic Sweden, 
2012). GDP in Sweden fell by 0.6 percent in 2008 and by 5.0 percent in 2009. Prior to 
the crisis, in 2006 and 2007, GDP in Sweden rose by 4.3 and 3.3 percent respectively. 
After the GFC, in 2010 and 2011, GDP in Sweden rose by 6.6 and 3.7 percent 
respectively (Statistic Sweden, 2012). 






Abdel-khalik, A. R. (1990), “The Jointness of Audit Fees and Demand for MAS: A Self 
Selection Analysis”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 295-322. 
Affärsvärlden (2013), Konsultguiden, Stockholm: Talentum. 
Al-Harshani, M. O. (2008), “The pricing of audit services: evidence from Kuwait”, Managerial 
Auditing Journal, Vol. 23 No. 7, pp. 685-696. 
Anderson, T. and Ze´ghal, D. (1994), “The pricing of audit services: further evidence from the 
Canadian market”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 24 No. 95, pp. 195–207. 
Antle, R., Gordon, E., Narayanamoorthy, G. and Zhou, L. (2006), “The joint determination of 
audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals”, Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 235-266. 
Barkess, L. and Simnett, R. (1994), “The Pricing of Other Services by Auditors: Independence 
and Pricing Issues”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 24, pp. 91-108. 
Brumfield, C. A., Elliot. R. K. and Jacobsen, P. D. (1983), “Business risk and the audit process”, 
Journal of Accountancy, April, pp. 60-68.  
Caneghem, T.V. (2010), “Audit pricing and the Big4 fee premium: evidence from Belgium”, 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 122-139. 
Chan, L., Chen, T-Y., Janakiraman, S. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2012), “Reexamining the 
Relationship between Audit and Nonaudit Fees: dealing With Weak Instruments in Two-Stage 
Least Squares Estimation”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 
299-324. 
Chan, P., Ezzamel, M. and Gwilliam, D. (1993), “Determinants of audit fees for quoted 
UKcompanies”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 20, pp. 765-786. 
Choi, J. H., Kim, J. B., Liu, X. H. and Simunic, D. A. (2008), “Audit pricing, legal liability 
regimes, and Big 4 premiums: theory and cross-country evidence”, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Vol. 25, pp. 55–99. 
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E. and Tehranian, H. (2011), “Liquidity risk 
management and credit supply in the financial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
101 No. 2, pp. 297–312. 
22 
 
Crasswell, A. T., Francis, J. R and Taylor, S. L. (1995), “Auditor brand name reputations and 
industry specializations”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 297–322. 
Davis, L. R., Ricchiute, D. N. and Trompeter, G. (1993), “Audit Efforts, Audit Fess, and the 
provision of Nonaudit Services to Audit Clients”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 68 No. 1, pp. 
135-150.  
DeFond, M. L., Francis, J. R. and Wong, T. J. (2000), “Auditor Industry Specialization and 
Market Segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong”, Auditing, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 49-66. 
Ezzamel, M., Gwilliam, D. R. and Holland, K. M. (1996), “Some Empirical Evidence from 
Publicly Quoted UK Companies on the Relationship Between the Pricing of Audit and Non-
audit Services”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 3-16. 
Ezzamel, M., Gwilliam, D. R. and Holland, K. M. (2002), “The Relationship between 
categories of non-audit services and audit fees: evidence from UK companies”, International 
Journal of Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 13-35. 
Ferguson, A., Francis, J. and Stokes, D. (2003), “The effects of firm-wide and office-level 
industry expertise on audit pricing”, The Accounting Review, Vol.78 No. 2, pp. 429–448.  
Firth, M. (1997), “The provision of non-audit services and the pricing of audit fees”, Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 511–525. 
Firth, M. (2002), “Auditor-Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit 
Fees and Audit Opinions”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 29 No. 5-6, pp. 
661–693. 
Francis, J. and Wang, D. (2008), “The joint eﬀect of investor protection and Big 4 audits on 
earnings quality around the world”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 25, pp.157–191. 
Francis, J.R. (1984), “The effect of audit firm size on audit prices”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 133-151. 
Gerrard, I., Houghton, K. and Woodliff, D. (1994), “Audit fees: The effects of auditee, auditor 
and industry differences”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 9 No. 7, pp. 3-11.  
Ghosh, A. and Pawlewicz, R. (2009), “The impact of regulation on auditor fees: evidence from 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 28, pp. 171–197. 
Goodwin, J. (2011), “What is the relation between audit partner business and audit quality?” 
available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1799681 (accessed 22 May 2013). 
23 
 
Gul, F., Jaggi B. and Krishnan G. (2007), “Auditor Independence: Evidence on the Joint Effects 
of Auditor tenure and Nonaudit Fees”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 26 No. 
2, pp. 117-142. 
Gul, F., Wu, D. and Yang, Z. (2013), “Do Individual Auditors Affect Audit Quality: Evidence 
From Archival Data”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 88 No. 6, pp. 1993-2023. 
Hay, D.C., Knechel, W. R. and Wong, N. (2006), “Audit Fees: A Meta-analysis of the Effect 
of Supply and Demand Attributes”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 
141-191. 
Ittonen, K. and Peni, E. (2012), “Auditor's Gender and Audit Fees”, International Journal of 
Auditing, Vol. 16 No 1, pp. 1–18. 
Ittonen, K., Peni, E. and Vähämaa, S. (2013), “Female Auditors and Accruals Quality”, 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 205-228. 
John, W., Hill, J.W., Ramsay R.J. and Simon, D.T. (1994), “Audit fees and client business 
risk during the S & L crisis: Empirical evidence and directions for future research”, Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 185-203. 
Judge, G.G., Hill, R.C., Griffiths, W.E., Lutkepohl, H. and Lee, T.C. (1988), Introduction to 
the Theory and Practice of Econometrics, NY: Wiley, New York. 
Knechel, W.R. and Sharma, D.S. (2012), “Auditor-provided nonaudit services and audit 
effectiveness and efficiency: Evidence from pre- and post-SOX audit report lags”, Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 85-114. 
Krishnan, G.V. and Yu, W. (2011), “Further evidence on knowledge spillover and the joint 
determination of audit and non-audit fees”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 
230-247. 
Krishnan, G.V. and Zhang, Y (2013), “Is There a Relation between Audit Fee Cuts During the 
Global Financial Crisis and Banks’ Financial Reporting Quality?” Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy (forthcoming) 
Maher, M.W., Tiessen, P., Colson, R. and Broman, A.J. (1992), “Competition and Audit Fees”, 
Accounting Review, Vol. 67 No. 1, pp. 199-211.  
Niemi, L. (2002) “Do firms pay for audit risk? Evidence on risk premiums in audit fees after 
direct control for audit effort”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 37-51. 
Palmrose, Z-V. (1986), “The Effect of Non-audit Services on the Pricing of Audit Services: 
Further Evidence”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 405-411. 
24 
 
Sikka, P. (2009), “Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors”, Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, Vol. 34, pp. 868-873. 
Simunic, D.A. (1980), “The Pricing of Audit services: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 161-190.  
Srinidhu, B. and Gul, F. (2007), “The Differential Effects of Auditors' Non-Audit and Audit 
Fees on Accrual Quality”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 595-629.  
Stanley J.D. (2011), “Is the Audit Fee Disclosure a Leading Indicator of Clients’ Business 
Risk?” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp.157-179. 
Sundgren, S. and Svanström, T. (2014), “Auditor-in-Charge Characteristics and Going Concern 
Reporting”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.31, No.2, pp. 531-550. 
Supervisory Board of Public Accountants, SBPA, (2013), Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 
2012.  
Svanström, T. and Sundgren, S. (2012), “The demand for Non-Audit Services and Auditor-
Client Relationships - Evidence from Swedish Small and Medium-Sized Companies”, 
International Journal of Auditing 16 (1), pp. 54-78.  
Tafara, E. (2006), “A race to the top: International regulatory reform post Sarbanes-Oxley”, 
International Financial Law Review, Vol. 13, pp. 12–18. 
Thinggaard, F. and Kiertzner, L. (2008), “Determinants of Audit Fees: Evidence from a Small 
Capital Market with a Joint Audit Requirement”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 12, 
pp. 141-158.  
Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S. and Raghunandan, K. (2003), “Evidence on the joint 
determination of audit and non-audit fees”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, pp. 721-
744. 
White, H. and Lu X. (2010), “Robustness Checks and Robustness Tests in Applied Economics”, 
available at: http://econ.ucsb.edu/ (accessed 6 February 2014). 
Xu, Y., Carson, E., Fargher, N. and Jiang, L (2013), “Responses by Australian auditors to the 
global ﬁnancial crisis”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 53, pp. 301–338. 
Zhang, T. and Huang, J. (2013), “The Risk Premium of Audit Fee: Evidence from the 2008 
Financial Crisis”, China Journal of Accounting Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47-61. 
 
25 
 
